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I. STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Introduction. 
Idaho County made a request for proposals (RFP) for a solid waste collection contract in 
the fall of 2012. Proposals were to be made by October 12, 2012, and would be opened at a public 
meeting on October 15, 2012. 
Simmons Sanitation Service, Inc. ("Simmons") responded to Idaho County's RFP. 
Appellant, Walco, Inc. ("Walco"), was the other responder. Simmons had for many years provided 
solid waste services in the eastern portion of Idaho County. Walco had provided similar services 
in the western portion of the County and along the Salmon River. 
Both proposals were opened in a public hearing on October 15, 2012. Walco, in Simmons' 
absence, discussed its proposal in detail at the first public hearing on October 15, 2012. Simmons 
and Walco participated in a series of subsequent public meetings held by the Idaho County 
Commissioners. Walco and Simmons openly discussed and argued the relative merits of the 
competing proposals to the Idaho County Commissioners in detail over the course of these 
meetings. 
Idaho County awarded the contract to Simmons effective January l, 2013. 
Walco subsequently brought suit, asserting that its bid figure was and remained a trade 
secret and that Simmons had misappropriated that secret. 
The District Court dismissed all of Walco' s claims. 
B. District Court Proceedings. 
Walco' s complaint against Simmons was for misappropriation of trade secrets under the 
Idaho Trade Secrets Act, Idaho Code§ 48-801 to 807 ("ITSA"). (R Vol. 1, p. 9-65.) Idaho County 
moved for summary judgment. (R Vol. 3, pp. 450-89, 552-77.) Simmons joined in Idaho 
County's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R Vol. 3, pp. 511-512.) 
In response, Walco filed its own cross-motion for summary judgment (R Vol. 6, pp. 1226-
42). 
At the December 20, 2013, hearing on the summary judgment motions, the District Court 
indicated it would be granting summary judgment to Idaho County and Simmons. (R Vol. 7, pp. 
1723-24.) Before the District Court could reduce its ruling to writing, Walco filed a motion for 
reconsideration. (R Vol. 8, pp. 1728-41.) After additional briefing and a hearing, the District 
Court granted summary judgment to Idaho County and Simmons on all of Walco's claims. (R 
Vol. 8, pp. 1820-36.) 
The District Court held that Walco did not, as a matter oflaw, take reasonable measures to 
protect the secrecy of its allegedly proprietary information. (R Vol. 8, pp. 1820-35.) Walco filed 
a timely Notice of Appeal. (R Vol. 8, pp. 1838-43.) 
Th.: District Court separately held that Walco's claim against Simmons was bmTed upon 
the additional grounds of estoppel since Walco engaged in extensive public discussion of the 
specifics of its submission and openly compared it to Simmons' submission and Simmons only 
learned ofWalco's proposal after Walco had made the proposal public. (R Vol. 3, pp. 1833-1834.) 
Walco did not identify the District Court's holding on this ground as an issue on appeal. 
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C. Appeal. 
Walco filed a Notice of Appeal. However, Walco did not identify as an issue on appeal 
Judge Stegner's dismissal of the case against Simmons on the grounds of estoppel. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues on appeal are as follows: 
1. Since the District Court dismissed the case as against Simmons on the grounds of 
estoppel, did Walco's failure to include that issue in its statement of issues pursuant to I.A.R. 
35(a)(4), compounded by Walco's failure to address the issue, cite to the record or provide 
supporting authority regarding that issue, eliminate consideration of that issue upon appeal? 
2. If Walco has not waived the estoppel issue on appeal, should Walco nonetheless be 
estopped from claiming misappropriation by its conduct before, on, and after the 3 p.m. meeting 
on October 15, 2012? Since the District Court dismissed the case as against Simmons on the 
grounds of estoppel, did Walco' s failure to include that issue in its statement of issues pursuant to 
I.A.R. 35(a)(4), compounded by Walco's failure to address the issue, cite to the record or provide 
supporting authority regarding that issue, eliminate consideration of that issue upon appeal? 
3. Did Walco fail to prove the existence of a trade secret under the ITSA, either because 
its information was readily ascertainable by proper means or because Walco failed to take 
reasonable steps to maintain the secrecy of its allegedly proprietary information? If Wal co has not 
waived the estoppel issue on appeal, should Walco nonetheless be estopped from claiming 
misappropriation by its conduct before, on, and after the 3 p.m. meeting on October 15, 2012? 
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III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
An award of attorneys' fees and costs on appeal should be awarded to Simmons pursuant 
to Idaho Code§ 12-121 and IRCP 54. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Introduction. 
1. The Grant of Judgment in Favor of Simmons on the Grounds ofEstoppel Has Not 
Been Appealed and, Thus, Should Not be Considered by this Court. 
Judge Stegner specifically ruled that Walco was estopped from making a claim against 
Simmons. Walco does not identify this as an issue presented on appeal and fails to address the 
District Court's ruling on this critical issue in its brief. This is fatal to Walco's appeal. S'ee, Kugler 
v. Drown, 119 Idaho 687,809 P.2d 1166 (1991) and Bolognese v. Forte, 153 Idaho 857,292 P.3d 
248 (2012). 
2. Walco Had No Trade Secret, At Least After Approximately 3:00 p.m. on October 
15, 2012. 
Simmons joins in Idaho County's argument and briefing on whether Walco had a trade 
secret at all. The County's argument is incorporated herein by reference to avoid duplication. See, 
I.A.R. 35(h). 
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3. If the Grant of Judgment in Simmons' Favor is Considered on Appeal, the District 
Court Judgment Should be Upheld. 
Assuming, arguendo, that Walco's claim against Simmons is properly before this Court on 
appeal, the District Court's decision that Walco is estopped from making a claim against Simmons 
is grounded on undisputed facts and consistent with applicable law. 
Walco, at a public hearing beginning at about 3:00 p.m. on October 15, 2012, put its 
proposal to the County into the public domain. Not only was this done without reservation, Walco 
continued to argue in favor of its proposal at that hearing and subsequent hearings. 
B. The Grant of Judgment in Favor of Simmons Has Not Been Appealed and, Thus, 
Should Not be Considered by this Court. 
Judge Stegner's decision in favor of Simmons on the grounds of estoppel should not be 
considered by this Court upon appeal since Walco failed to raise that decision as an issue on appeal 
or cite to the record or any authority to show that Judge Stegner committed error in that portion of 
his decision. 
In Kugler v. Drown, 119 Idaho 687, 809 P.2d 1166 (1991 ), the Idaho Appellate Court held 
that the failure of the appellant to include an issue in the statement of issues required by I.AR. 
35(a)(4) will eliminate consideration of that issue on appeal: 
Our appellate rules require that 
the brief of appellant shall contain: ... ( 4) ... A list of the 
issues presented on appeal, expressed in the terms and 
circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail. 
The statement of the issues should be short and concise, and 
should not be repetitious. The issues shall fairly state the 
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issues presented for review. The statement of the issues 
presented will be deemed to include every subsidiary issue 
fairly comprised therein. 
I.A.R. 35(a)(4). 
The Kugler court went on to address the consequences of the failure to identify an issue on 
appeal: 
Failure of the appellant to include an issue in the statement of issues 
required by I.A.R. 35(a)(4) will eliminate consideration of that issue 
on appeal. State v. Prestwich, 116 Idaho 959, 961, 783 P.2d 298, 
300 (1989) (citing.Jensen v. Doherty, IOI Idaho 910,911,623 P.2d 
1287, 1288 (1981) and Drake v. Craven, 105 Idaho 734, 736, 672 
P.2d 1064, 1066 (Ct.App.1983)). 
Id at 691, 1170. See also, Haight v. Dales Used Cars, Inc., 139 Idaho 853, 87 P.3d 962 (2003). 
This Court in Bolognese v. Forte, 153 Idaho 857, 292 P.3d 248 (2012) further cited to 
established Idaho law that the failure to support an argument by citations to the record and 
provision of applicable legal authority means that the issue may not be considered on appeal. 
First, the court in Bolognese stated the following requirements for compliance of I.A.R. 
35(a)(6): 
Id. at 866, 257. 
The argument section of the appellant's brief '·shall contain the 
contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues preseGted on 
appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes 
and parts of the transcript and record relied upon." I.A.R. 35(a)(6). 
Having established the requirements of the rule, the court went on to dete1mine the 
consequences of an appellant's failure to do so: 
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Id. 
"We will not consider assignments of error not supported by 
argument and authority in the opening brief." Hogg v. Wolske, 142 
Idaho 549, 559, 130 P.3d 1087, 1097 (2006). "A party waives an 
issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not 
just if both are lacking." State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 
P.2d 966, 970 (1996). 
An appellant must first identify the error on appeal in its identification of issues upon 
appeal. Kugler, supra. That is necessary to preserve the issue, but not enough to do so. The 
appellant must also support the argument that the trial court committed error by citation to the 
record and authorities. Otherwise, this Court may not consider the assignment of error. Bolognese, 
supra. 
The reasoning for this rule can also be found in Bolognese: 
In addition, ''because an appellant can only prevail if the claimed 
error affected a substantial right, the appellant must present some 
argument that a substantial right was implicated." Hurtado v. Land 
O'Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 18, 278 P.3d 415, 420 (2012). "This 
Court will not search the record for error. We do not presume error 
on appeal; the party alleging error has the burden of showing it in 
the record." Miller v. Callear, 140 Idaho 213, 218, 91 P.3d 1117, 
1122 (2004) (citations omitted). Finally, "[t]his Court will not 
consider issues raised for the first time on appeal." Clear Springs 
Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 150 Idaho 790, 812, 252 P.3d 71, 93 
(2011). 
Bolognese v. Forte, 153 Idaho 857,866,292 P.3d 248, 257 (2012). 
If Walco cannot now belatedly raise this issue on appeal, its case against Simmons is 
concluded. Judge Stegner's ruling would be that, in effect, even if the claimed information is a 
trade secret, Walco is estopped from making any such claim against Simmons. 
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If so. this Court should affirm the decision in favor of Simmons and make an appropriate 
award of fees and costs in Simmons' favor. 
C. If the Issue of Estoppel Is Properly Raised on Appeal, then the Judgment of the 
District Court Should be Affirmed. 
There arc two general principles that control whether Walco has a viable claim against 
Simmons on these facts. 
1. Walco' s Public Disclosure of the Purported Secret Denies It Any Protected Status. 
First, the general rule is that disclosure of a trade secret abandons secrecy. Idaho County 
has argued this principle extensively and its authorities and reasoning are included here by 
reference to avoid duplication. See, I.AR. 35(h). 
Of particular importance is Idaho County's exhaustive citations to the record showing 
hours of public meetings over several weeks where Walco not only disclosed every detail of its 
proposal but argued that their proposal was superior to that of Simmons. idaho County's citations 
to the record are also included herein by reference per I.AR. 35(h). 
It is axiomatic that to be and remain a trade secret, the information n1ust be kept secret: 
An element of secrecy is of the very essence of a trade secret. .Where 
a trade secret is so disclosed that the requisite element of sec_recv~ 
_destroved, the trade secret loses its protected status. In the following 
cases the courts explicitly or impliedly held or recognized that a 
general public disclosure of a trade secret hy a party asserting a 
protectible interest therein, or pursuant to the authority of such a 
party, 1~esults in an abandomnent of the element of secrecy and in a 
destruction of trade secret status. 
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Disclosure of'Trade secret as Abandonment ofSecrecy, 92 A.L.R.3d 138, Section 3(a). (Emphasis 
added.) (Footnote omitted.) Walco's promiscuous delivery and display of its proposals, 
accompanied by arguments for the superiority of its proposals fails this baseline requirement. 
Walco cites no authority where one can first disclose a trade secret publicly but later take it back 
and reinstate the 'secret' status. 
The District Court's decision on this issue should be affirmed as to both Idaho County and 
Simmons based on the undisputed record and authorities cited herein. 
2. Even If Walco Can be Seen as Having a Protectable Trade Secret, It is Estopped 
from Asserting a Claim Against Simmons. 
Walco admits that it allowed disclosure of its purported secret in a public meeting. (R Vol. 
8, p. 1786.) Walco also admits that Simmons had no knowledge of this before the public meeting. 
(R Vol. 5, pp. 1095-1096.) Based on these undisputed facts, Judge Stegner concluded that the 
Walco claim against Simmons should be dismissed. 
Judge Stegner's reasoning in dismissing Walco's claim against Simmons is concise and is 
not mentioned, much less rebutted, by Walco: 
The Restatement also indicates in § 757, comment d, that a 
"privilege to disclose or use another's trade secret may arise from 
the other's consent or from other conduct on his part by which he is 
estopped from complaining." Such is the case here. Walco engaged 
in extensive public discussion of the specifics of its submission and 
openly compared it to Simmons's submission. This discussion 
occurred at meetings that were public. Anyone could attend and 
listen to the argument over the merits of each proposal submitted to 
the County. 
(R Vol. 8, pp. 1833-1834.) 
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Judge Stegner also dealt with the rather confusing theory on Walco's part that the RFP 
was actually a competitive bid: 
Even under Walco's theory that this process was one for competitive 
bids rather than an alternative RFP process, the statutory provisions 
governing competitive bids contemplate the opening of bids in the 
presence of the public. In the bid processes contained in LC, §§ 67-
2805 and 67-2806, no matter if it is a process for services, or public 
works bids, the sealed bids "shall be opened in public at a 
designated place and time ... " (emphasis supplied). I.C. §§ 67-
2805(3)(a)(v), 67-2805(3)(b)(ix), 67-2806(2)(e). Consequently, 
even if this Court were to grant Walco's motion for summary 
judgment and conclude that the County's request for proposals was 
in fact a request for bids, it would defeat Walco's claim for 
misappropriation of a trade secret because that process must be 
public. 
The circumstances created by a public bidding process fornish 
Idaho County with such a privilege to evaluate, discuss, and use 
Walco's submission such that Walco is estopped from asserting a 
claim for misappropriation of one's trade secret. As a result, 
Walco's trade secret claim does not establish a prima facie case, 
since Walco did not make sufficient efforts to maintain 
confidentiality, and Walco should be estopped from asserting a 
trade secret claim since Idaho County held a privilege to use and 
disclose the information submitted by Walco in the way it was 
submitted. 
(Emphasis original.) (R Vol. 8, pp. 1833-1834.) 
Judge Stegner, based on undisputed facts, found that whether the process was an RFP or a 
competitive bid (as Walco contends), that Walco agreed to and did, in fact, take part in a very 
public process. This prevents them from suing Simmons who did no more than participate in the 
same process under the control and direction of the Idaho County Commissioners. 
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Judge Stegner's ruling is supported by general principles of estoppel. The law has a 
succinct way of expressing a similar and analogous concept in the case of judicial estoppel. 
Idaho adopted the doctrine of judicial estoppel in Loomis v. Church. 76 Idaho 87, 277 P.2d 
561 (1954). Judicial estoppel precludes a party from advantageously taking one position, then 
subsequently seeking a second position that is incompatible with the first. A & J Const. Co. v. 
Wood, 141 Idaho682,684, 116P.3d 12, 14(2005). Seealso,Heinzev. Bauer, 145Idaho232, 178 
P.3d 597 (2007). The policy behind judicial estoppel is to protect "the integrity of the judicial 
system, by protecting the orderly administration of justice and having regard for the dignity of the 
judicial proceeding." Id. at 685, 116 P.3d at 15 (quoting Robertson Suppzy Inc. v. Nicholls, 131 
Idaho 99, 101, 952 P.2d 914, 916 (Ct.App.1998)). Broadly accepted, it is intended to prevent 
parties from playing fast and loose with the legal system. See, McCallister v. Blackfoot Medical 
Center, 154 Idaho 891,303 P.3d 578 (2013). 
While judicial estoppel is not directly applicable, the policy underlying that judicial 
principal supports the District Court's ruling that Walco cannot so blithely take inconsistent 
positions. To attempt to win the contract, Walco made its proposal public. When that approach 
failed, they reversed course and attempt to win damages by alleging that the Walco proposal was 
actually a secret and remained so even after Walco thrust it into the public domain. 
The broader doctrine of estoppel shows that the purpose of the doctrine is to deny rewards 
from those who seek advantage by taking inconsistent positions. Equitable estoppel, applicable 
by analogy at least, is a means of preventing a party from asse1iing a legal claim or defense that is 
contrary or inconsistent with his or her prior action or conduct: 
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Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, certain conduct by a party 
is viewed as being so offensive that it precludes the party from later 
asserting a claim or defense that would otherwise be meritorious; in 
other words, it serves to offset the benefit that the offending party 
would otherwise derive from the conduct. Equitable estoppel 
prevents a party from asserting rights when his or her own conduct 
renders that assertion contrary to equity and good conscience. 
28 Am.Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver§ 27. (Footnotes omitted.) 
Walco':.; actions fit this pattern by first publicly disclosing its information and subsequently 
claiming as secret what Walco had itself disclosed. 
Walco, as Judge Stegner properly found, should be estopped from having any claim against 
Simmons. To hold otherwise is to reward Walco for " ... playing fast and loose with the legal 
system .... '· See, McCallister v. Blaclifbot Medical Center, 154 Idaho 89L 303 P.3d 578 (2013). 
D. Walco is Not the Victim of Unfair Dealing. 
Walco's brief is rife with characterizations that are in conflict with the record, and legal 
citations that mischaracterize the law, as Idaho County points out very carefully in its brief. 
Walco's argument, stripped to the essentials, is that somehow Wa!co was not treated fairly 
by Idaho County and that Simmons had some unfair advantage. The facts are otherwise, and belie 
Walco's claim that it is somehow the victim here. 
Idaho County offered Walco a sole source contract on several occasions, the last being in 
August of 2012. (R Vol. 2, pp. 189-209.) Walco refused this opportunity. J\s Walco admitted in 
a brief moment of candor, "[H]owever, the parties reached an impasse when Jdaho County 
repeatedly insisted that Walco fund the County's unprofitable recycling program." See, 
Appellant's Brie( p. 2. 
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Walco admits thereby that Idaho County wanted the contract to include provisions to 
support the County's recycling program. Walco refused to accept what the County policy required. 
On July 31, 2012, Idaho County and Simmons executed a ten-year renewal contract 
effective January 1, 2013, for Simmons' established coverage area. (R Vol. 2, pp. 165-85.) This 
contract included a surcharge obligating Simmons to pay, under the terms of the contract, certain 
moneys to support the County recycling program. 
Even after the Simmons contract was awarded, Idaho County again offered a sole source 
contract to Walco for the rest of the county. (R Vol. 2, pp. 189-209.) 
Only after Walco refused the repeated offer of a sole source contract, the County chose to 
issue its RFP. 
As part of the RFP, the County provided, inter alia, a proposed contract. The County's 
proposed contract contained three material terms of relevance. First, the County wanted to retain 
the right to implement a "recycling surcharge" by which the contractor might in the future rebate 
the County (on a per-ton basis) for any reduction in collected waste resulting from the removal of 
recyclable materials from the solid waste stream. (R Vol. 2, pp. 229--30 §§ 11.2, 11.3.) Second, 
the County intended to continue to allow for annual base rate increases based on changes to the 
Consumer Price Index. (R Vol. 2, p. 226 § 7.1.) Third, the County was willing to continue paying 
the fuel surcharge agreed to in 2008, provided that the County would, in turn, continue to receive 
a fuel credit for decreases to fuel prices. (R Vol. 2, p. 227 § 7.2.) 
Walco responded to the RFP with a 33 page proposal and included a contract that differed 
materially from the County's proposed contract. (R Vol. 1, pp. 28-63.) In particular: 
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1. Walco disregarded the County's policy of a recycling surcharge provision; 
2. Walco discarded the historic annual base rate adjustment to CPI and 
replaced it with an annual, invariable, compounding 5% increase. 
3. Walco discarded the fuel surcharge provision in the County proposed 
contract (which allowed for a decrease if fuel prices declined) in favor of a flat 5% per 
year, compounded, increase in the base price. 
3. Walco proposed an initial base price of $87,000 per month for Walco. (R 
Vol. 2, pp. 242, 244-71.) 
A comparison to the Simmons proposal is helpful. Simmons proposed a base price of 
$77,202 per month and also: 
I. Agreed to the support the recycling program with a surcharge on its 
contract; and, 
2. Agreed to continue the prior County practice of increases based on CPI 
adjustments and a fuel price surcharge that would go up or down based on fuel prices. (R 
Vol. 1, pp. 13 if 20, 65; R Vol. 2, p. 242.) 1 
Idaho County's brief accurately describes the substance of many hours of public meetings 
wherein the Idaho County Commissioners heard Walco argue and try to explain how the Walco 
1 Simmons proposed a base rate and only one material deviation from the pricing terms proposed by the 
Commissioners: an additional per-ton charge for waste exceeding 4,500 tons per year. (R Vol. 2, p. 242 (Simmons 
proposal agreeing "to perform collection of solid waste per Idaho Counties (sic) proposal specifications"); see also R 
Vol. 2, pp. 220---32 (RFP with proposed contract labeled "proposal specifications").) 
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contract was actually better for the County than the Simmons contract. Eventually, even Walco 
had to concede that point: 
COMMISSIONER BRANDT: Okay. I see we need to crunch a lot more numbers. 
MR. HOLMAN: After all this Robert may still be lower, but I just wanted to make 
sure all the numbers are considered before you get to an awarding process because 
I don't want to know that we didn't let you know where he possibly might be 
without us at least defending our side and saying where our number is. So he may 
still come out lower after you're done crunching. I just didn't want it to be 77,000 
as compared to 87,000 as a black and white number. 
MR. MACGREGOR: I would say table it for a month -- I mean, for a week -- for a 
week and crunch some of the numbers. 
(R Vol. 5, p. 993 LL. 19-25, p. 994 LL. 1-7.) (Emphasis added.) 
One might admire Walco for the aggressive approach they took in meeting the County's 
RFP. However, aggression involves risk and it should surprise no one, not even Walco, that their 
higher cost proposal that rejected established County policies would be understood to be inferior 
to Simmons' proposal. 
V. CONCLUSION 
First, this appeal should be dismissed as against Simmons since Walco did not identify as 
an issue on appeal that the case was dismissed against Simmons on the grounds of estoppel, nor 
did Walco cite to the record or any authorizes that would show Judge Stegner to have committed 
error in so holding. Judge Stegner clearly established estoppel as a separate and sufficient ground 
for dismissal. This emerges from the language of his opinion and his careful use of the word "and" 
at page 15 (R Vol. 8, p. 1834) ofhis opinion before going on to explain why Walco's claim against 
15 
Simmons is stopped. Waleo's failure to even attempt to show this to be error precludes 
consideration of this issue on appeal. See, Bolognese, supra. 
Secondly, the transcripts of the meetings from October 15, 2012, and onward disclose that 
the Idaho County Commissioners fully engaged in giving both Walco and Simmons a full and fair 
chance to win the public contract in discussions held in a public forum. The transcripts also show 
that Waleo made a full-throated and detailed argument as to why their proposal was superior, 
before eventually conceding, at least, that Simmons' base price was lower. This pattern supports 
the argument made by Idaho County (and joined by Simmons) that nothing secret survived the 
public disclosure. 
Finally, even if some trade secret arguably may exist, it would be inequitable to impose 
liability on Simmons for acquiring information only after Walco made it public. and Waleo should 
be found estopped from doing so. 
Therefore, the District Court's opinion on this matter should be affirmed. 
DATED this 30th day of January, 2015. 
RISLEY LAW QFFICE, PLLC 
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